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Abstract 
The past two decades have seen an increase in the incidence of private sector providers entering the 
higher education sector in the UK, which has raised concerns over the quality of provision and whether 
the quality assurance regime is rigorous enough to ensure the quality of private provision. Collaboration 
between universities and private providers is one of the ways in which private for-profit organisations 
contribute to higher education provision in the UK. For a private sector organisation to operate 
successfully in the sector it needs to gain legitimacy. This paper, therefore investigates the case of a 
private for-profit organisation that has a collaboration with three UK universities. The lens of 
institutional theory and legitimacy has been utilised to explain the influence that the collaboration had 
on the shaping of the quality assurance practices in the private provider.  
Key words: Private provider; higher education; collaboration; quality assurance; institutional theory; 
legitimacy. 
 
Introduction and context 
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The Higher Education sector has seen significant changes in the past two decades, not least the 
changing focus from public good to private economic good (Marginson, 2007; Brown, 2013) . This is not 
confined to the United Kingdom, but is evident in many economies where Governments have shifted 
funding regimes from the state to the institutions, and ultimately to individual students (Meek, 2000; 
Varghese, 2004; Ward, 2007). Government policies are increasingly treating and using higher education 
as a contributor to the economic prosperity of the country (Jacob & Hellstrom, 2003; Nelles & Vorley, 
2010). As a result there has been a move away from elite education towards mass education systems 
through widening participation schemes (Hayhoe, 1995; Wang, 2003; Kember, 2010;). In order to 
respond to these changes many higher education institutions have adopted a more managerial 
approach to management (Turnbull & Edwards, 2005; Eckel, 2007; Floyd, 2007) and private sector 
organisations have therefore been attracted into the sector (Middlehurst & Fielden, 2010).  
In some countries the sector has seen significant structural changes with higher education providers 
becoming more diversified as the number of private sector institutions entering the sector has grown 
(Kember, 2010). Whilst “countries such as the USA, Japan and Chile have well-established private 
sectors of higher education, such provision has grown in virtually all the major regions of the world over 
the last decade, including Africa, the Middle East and the central and eastern European countries” 
(King, 2009, p.1). This growth in the private sector provision has to an extent been fuelled by a 
reframing of the regulatory environment from explicit controls to a more hands-off approach controlled 
via monitoring mechanisms and accountability (Varghese, 2004).  
The private sector contributes in a variety of ways to higher education. Middlehurst & Fielden (2010, 
p.13) identified a range of functions provided by the private sector which include: offering own degrees; 
joint provision; contributing course materials; contracted tutorial services; specialist assessment 
services; and provision of professional development. Their report highlights a trend, also supported by 
King (2009) and Baines & Chiarelott (2010), that the private organisations are playing an increasing role 
in the sector often via collaboration with an established university. This report identified that 
approximately 60% of UK universities surveyed were involved in collaborative arrangements with 
private sector organisations. The increasing role of private sector providers has attracted some criticism 
ranging from concerns over quality standards (Hunt, 2010; Brown, 2013), to the cherry picking of high 
demand subject areas which are vocational in nature (Ward, 2007). In recent years the reputation of the 
private sector providers has not been helped by the so called ‘degree mills’ that “offer credentials based 
on little study or engagement in higher education activity” (CHEA, 2009, p.1) and the badge hunters: 
those organisations that have some limited contact with established universities and use the association 
to gain an air of legitimacy to recruit students to their own programmes. There are, however, some 
recognised benefits provided by the participation of private sector organisations such as the fact that 
they tend to be more teaching focused (Floyd, 2007; Kwiek, 2008) and not tied to the academic 
tradition of: two or three teaching terms; followed by an assessment period; followed by summer break, 
enabling a more flexible approach to be taken to the provision of courses, thus providing “more 
flexibility in entry routes and modes of study” (QAA, 2010, p.3).  
This paper reviews, therefore, the literature relating to collaboration and legitimacy within institutional 
theory and explains the research methodology. The nature of the collaboration is then outlined and is 
followed by an explanation/exploration of how the Code of Practice governing collaborations and the 
fact that the private provider was seeking taught degree awarding powers in its own right, influenced 
the development of the quality assurance practices within the organisation. In a sector where the 
reputation of the awarding institution has an impact on the value of a degree the private sector 
organisations gain an element of legitimacy by working in collaboration with established universities.  
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Collaboration leading to legitimacy 
There is a presumption that collaboration will benefit both parties and that each party has something to 
bring to the collaboration (May & Winter, 2007). Often the presumption is that collaboration will 
enhance the service provision in some way by improving efficiency levels, achieving cost reductions, 
enhancing flexibility or the fostering of innovation. However, Agranoff & McGuire (2003) suggest that 
the parties involved are not always helpful to one another. The success of the collaboration is based on a 
building of trust but if managed badly could result in conflict which negates any perceived benefits. It is 
therefore important to realise that each party has something to bring, and hence something at stake 
when entering into a collaborative undertaking, whether those stakes are of an ethereal nature such as 
reputation, or more substantive such as resources, or a change in status such as giving up autonomy or 
control (Bardach, 1998). The challenge is to ensure that the short term interests of any one partner do 
not undermine the broader policy objectives of the collaboration (Milward & Provan, 2000). A healthy 
collaboration could be seen as one in which the managers are actively involved and supportive of the 
relationship (May & Winter, 2007).  
Authors point to the fact that indirect benefits may accrue to the private organisations in a partnership 
arrangement with a public sector or state sector institution (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Peng, Seung-Hyun & 
Wang, 2005; Dacin, Oliver & Roy, 2007) and that the incidence of these can be a key element in the 
success of the collaboration. Among the indirect benefits highlighted are expanded business scope and 
enhanced legitimacy. For a private sector institution operating in the higher education sector legitimacy 
is an important factor, not just in the process of recruiting students, but also in attracting established 
university partners with which to collaborate. The private sector organisation is able to capture not only 
a financially lucrative business opportunity, but also to benefit from reputation by association, and thus 
gain legitimacy within the sector. Kivleniece & Quelin (2012, p.259) identified that, “... private players 
entering an industry of traditionally strong public sector competence, such as education or social care, 
are increasingly likely to engage in integration partnership forms, at least initially, to enhance learning 
and acquisition of intangible, organizationally embedded skills and routines”. Meyer, Scott & Deal 
(1983) suggest that in complex and regulated environments, such as found in the education sector, 
organisations are naturally driven to adopt the practices and procedures of established players even if 
they create operational inefficiencies (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). It is suggested that this process, referred 
to as institutionalisation, works to produce a common understanding about what is acceptable 
behaviour within the sector (Zucker, 1987). DiMaggio & Powell (1983, p.148) describe this as a 
consequence of two factors: “firstly the emergence and structuration of an organisational field as a 
result of the activities of a diverse set of organisations; and, second, the homogenisation of these 
organisations, and of new entrants, once the field is established”. DiMaggio & Powell argued that the 
concept that best captures the process of homogenisation is isomorphism. Meyer & Rowan (1977, 
pp.348-349) suggest that, “isomorphism with environmental institutions has some crucial consequences 
for organisations: (a) they incorporate elements which are legitimated externally, rather than in terms 
of efficiency; (b) they employ external or ceremonial assessment criteria to define the value of structural 
elements; and (c) dependence on externally fixed institutions reduces turbulence and maintains 
stability. As a result, ..... institutional isomorphism promotes the success and survival of organisations”.  
Thus the players gain legitimacy within the sector. To support this newer organisations adopt the 
language, organisational labels and goals of the established institutions (Blum & McHugh 1971). This 
suggests to some extent that isomorphism can be the result of intentional actions to gain legitimacy. 
However, Aurini (2006) suggests that when private sector organisations possess other means of 
demonstrating legitimacy, such as high pass rates and high levels of student support and nurturing, 
they are able to deviate from the institutional norms. They are able to use the symbols of legitimacy to 
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appeal to selected audiences. The success of these organisations suggests there could be an erosion of 
traditional institutional norms which creates an enhanced opportunity for greater heterogeneity in the 
sector (Huisman & Morphew, 1998). Perhaps of note here is the fact that Kember (2010) reported an 
increase in diversity of higher education providers in Hong Kong and also the US as a result of private 
sector involvement. There are, however, implications for private sector institutions seeking 
collaborative partnerships in that legitimacy is quickly achieved if industry standards are adopted 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1991).  
There are two views of legitimacy that emerge from the literature. First, the institutional tradition that 
emphasises the view of the structuration dynamics and isomorphic forces that operate at an industry 
sector level (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1987; Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Powell 
& DiMaggio, 1991). In uncertain environments it is often easiest for managers seeking legitimacy simply 
to adopt the pre-existing norms and values. By mimicking the most prominent entities in the field they 
pursue a strategy of taken-for-grantedness via mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1983). Conforming in such a way means they pose few challenges to the institutional regime 
and therefore acceptance is achieved with little problem (Meyer & Rowan, 1991). Suchman (1995) 
suggests that when organisations gain pragmatic and moral legitimacy by complying with instrumental 
demands and altruistic ideals respectively, they also gain a degree of cognitive legitimacy.  
The second view takes a strategic perspective and focuses on the institution and the way organisations 
utilise the symbols and norms of the industry to gain societal support (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling 
& Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The two views differ in the degree to which 
organisations are seen to take conscious decisions to adopt the norms and procedures of the industry. 
Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) suggest that organisations actively adopt legitimacy-building strategies. These 
involve: seeking the approval of existing audiences within the industry; selecting to seek approval of 
specific audiences; or attempting to create new audiences and forms of legitimation. These strategies 
require a mix of organisational change and persuasive communication strategies that Oliver (1991) 
suggests form a continuum from passive conformity to active manipulation. However, not all clusters 
identified by Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) are open to organisations. The choice of strategy may be limited 
by practicalities and organisations do still retain some discretion due to the fact that isomorphic 
pressure is multifaceted (Tolbert, 1985) indicating that the process is not that of unconscious adaptation 
or pure opportunism: rather it is a purposive decision with a strong strategic and long-term emphasis. 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) suggested that organisations can be active in ‘window-dressing’, i.e. develop 
‘double-standards’ to deal with the mixed expectations of various audiences. A counter argument would 
suggest that with the deployment of an external quality assurance regime and increased accountability 
it is difficult to maintain such deception in the long run. Stensaker & Norgard (2001) also provide 
support for this argument in that the suggestion that organisations are deliberately cheating via a 
superficial display of symbolic norms and practices establishes a quite negative view of organisations. A 
note of caution was sounded by Ashforth & Gibbs (1990) who suggested that organisations, having 
gained legitimacy, are in danger of relaxing their vigilance and being content with ‘business-as-usual’ 
resulting in missing a change in audience response and losing their claims to legitimacy.  
Research methodology 
Interest in the research project was stimulated by the criticisms of private sector education providers 
and in particular the maintenance of quality standards (Tapper & Slater, 1998; Ward, 2007; Marks, 2008; 
Hunt, 2010). There has also been criticism of the quality assurance regimes in place to control private 
sector providers, suggesting that they are not as rigorous as for established universities (UUK, 2010; 
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Middlehurst & Fielden, 2010; Tatlow, 2010). The Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), the organisation 
whose “job it is to safeguard quality and standards in UK universities and colleges” (QAA, 2014), 
identified between 2007 and 2010 several universities that were not managing their collaborative 
partners closely enough, some of whom where private providers. The QAA (2010) states that it is the 
universities responsibility to manage their collaborative partners effectively. Aurini, (2006) suggests 
that legitimacy is a key driver for success of the private sector providers in higher education and Dacin 
et al. (2007) identifies that for the private sector provider, gaining legitimacy is a key output of 
collaborative arrangements. The research project therefore explores whether the act of seeking 
legitimacy via collaborations in the higher education sector influenced the quality assurance practices of 
private sector providers. An opportunity arose to study this via a case study research strategy, which 
facilities the exploration of a particular phenomenon in a real life situation in order to gain a better 
understanding of the phenomenon (Yin, 2003). The opportunity to adopt a single case explanatory-
exploratory methodology to investigate this particular issue (Stake, 1995) using a longitudinal study 
enabled the framing of the research question as: Does the act of seeking legitimacy through 
collaborations influence the quality assurance practices adopted by a private sector higher education 
provider?  
Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2000, p.181) state that “Case studies can establish cause and effect, indeed 
one of their strengths is that they observe effects in real contexts, recognising that context is a powerful 
determinant of both causes and effects. ......... Further contexts are unique and dynamic, hence case 
studies investigate and report the complex dynamic and unfolding interactions of events, human 
relationships and other factors in a unique instance”. The unique instance here is that the case 
organisation was preparing to apply for taught degree awarding powers (tDAP) in its own right and 
wished to use existing collaborations with established universities to provide the evidence base for its 
application. The organisation therefore had a specific interest in gaining legitimacy within the sector.   
The research opportunity was facilitated further by the fact that the researcher was employed by the 
case organisation for a period of 18 months to assist with the tDAP application process. This allowed the 
researcher to observe the decisions and their effects in a real context and, by being part of the decision-
making body, to gain insight from reflection, not just about the cause and effect, but as Cohen et al. 
(2000) suggest, recognising that the context is a powerful determinate of both the cause and effect and 
thus the participant observer is in a unique position to more fully understand the context.  It was 
possible to gather data over a period of time thus adding to the study by providing an unbroken 
chronology of events for analysis, enabling the researcher to report a blend of description and analysis 
(Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995; Yin 2003). The variety of evidence that could be collected (documents, 
artefacts, interviews, conversations and observations) was much greater and richer than could be 
collected via other means open to the researcher. This assists in negating the criticism of a lack of rigour 
in the case study approach, in that, a richness of data is available from a “variety of sources allowing 
triangulation of data to improve the validity and enhance the academic rigour of the study” (Yin, 2003, 
p.99). In this respect Bryman & Bell (2003, p.56) comment that, “case study researchers tend to argue 
that they aim to generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which they then 
engage in a theoretical analysis”. The mode of generalisation referred to here is “analytic generalisation 
in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical 
results of the case study” (Yin, 2003, p.28). The analysis has therefore been conducted with reference to 
legitimacy building and institutional theory as a means of providing a theoretical framework in which to 
understanding the situation more fully.   
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Concerns of participant observation are recognised in that there is the strong potential for bias to be 
present in the interpretation of findings. As Somekh (1995, p.342) suggests: “.. it is impossible to draw 
the line between data which have been collected as part of the research and data which have been 
collected as part of the job.” The richness, however, of the experience and the understanding of the 
rationale behind decisions and actions can add to the level of insight that can be drawn from the 
analysis of such data. The researcher had access to internal documentation, both historical and current 
(to the period of the study), such as: minutes of meetings; external examiner reports; reports written to 
and received from collaborative partners; general correspondence between the private sector 
organisation and the collaborative partners. The organisation has given consent for the information to 
be used within the research study so long as anonymity is preserved. External data was available such as 
information publicly available on websites of collaborative partners, reports and codes of practice from 
the QAA. Artefacts used internally such as planning spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations and 
flipcharts were available as part of the job and also utilised as data in the research. Also numerous 
interviews and conversations with the Collaborative Provision Managers, Quality Assurance staff, 
academics and managers of the collaborative partners have been utilised as well as interactions with the 
private institutions staff, all with their permission. The data has been analysed and interpreted using a 
thematic approach (Ritchie, Spencer & O’Connor, 2003) with reference to the theoretical framework of 
legitimacy and institutional theory in order to understand whether the act of seeking legitimacy 
influenced the quality assurance practices of the private sector provider.  
As indicated earlier the researcher was in the employment of the private sector organisation during the 
18 months of the study and the data was collected with the full knowledge of the organisation’s 
management and staff that it was the intention to undertake a research study into the quality 
management issues associated with private sector higher education providers. Similarly the 
collaborative partners were made aware of the researcher’s interest and data captured with their 
approval. However, in order to provide some protection for the organisations involved the private sector 
organisation has been referred to as PrivateCo and the partner universities are referred to simply as 
University A, University B, and University C.  
The nature of the collaborative arrangement 
The case study organisation is a private sector for-profit company that is in collaborative partnerships 
with three UK universities. The senior management were considering applying for taught degree 
awarding powers (tDAP) in their own right, which provided the opportunity to explore the question of 
whether seeking legitimacy aids the maintenance of quality standards. The rationale for applying for 
tDAP was not to abandon collaborations but to strengthen the collaboration via joint degree 
programmes. The CEO had also identified that overseas institutions were more likely to work with an 
UK institution if it held tDAP in its own right. The tDAP was therefore seen by the Board of Directors as 
a means of strengthening further its legitimacy within the sector.   
The QAA suggest that a good foundation for applying for tDAP is to gain experience of higher 
education provision via partnering with established universities (Pitcher, 2011). This provides the track 
record and evidence that the organisation is capable of providing education to industry standards. The 
organisation gains experience and knowledge of the expected norms of the sector (Meyer & Rowan, 
1978) and thus gains a degree of legitimacy (Dacin et al., 2007).  In 2004 a change in the criteria for 
holding tDAP allowed non-publicly funded organisations to apply (QAA, 2004). The application is 
evidence based and the applying organisation submits itself to a period of scrutiny by the QAA, who 
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then recommend to the Privy Council, a formal body of advisers to the head of state and the body that 
ultimately sanctions the award, whether the organisation is fit to hold degree awarding powers.  
The partner universities are what could be described as post 1992 universities in that prior to the Further 
and Higher Education Act 1992 they operated as polytechnics or colleges of higher education. There 
were two specific reasons for seeking post 1992 universities as partners: firstly, they were more likely to 
work with a teaching led private sector organisation and in the words of the Chief Executive, “They are 
not so snobbish in their attitude to the private sector”; and secondly they were managed in a more 
business-like manner than the pre 1992 universities, partly due to the governance structure that UK 
polytechnics had been obliged to adopt (Dearlove, 1998). This final point, according to the Chief 
Executive, “makes them easier to do business with”.  
The PrivateCo had, over a period of fourteen years, built up a portfolio of undergraduate and 
postgraduate programmes in business related subjects that it offered with the three university partners. 
The universities were working with other collaborative partners, both nationally and internationally. 
The number of collaborations were: University A, 24; University B, 36; and University C, 44. Thus the 
universities were experienced at operating collaborative arrangements and saw the distinct benefits of 
collaborative provision, both financially to the university via validation and franchise fees, and also 
strategic via the increased opportunities to students in terms of flexible start dates and condensed 
provision, which was more difficult to achieve for a university given the strong traditions of the 
academic year. PrivateCo had over 5,000 full-time students of which 70% were recruited onto University 
A programmes, 20% University B and 10% University C. , via a mix of validated and franchised 
programmes.  
“The ultimate goal of any partnership is to create a synergistic environment in which the individual 
weaknesses of each partner are compensated by the strengths of the remaining partners, creating a 
state of mutual dependency and accountability to one another”, (Anderson, Michael & Peirce, 2012, 
p.3). Universities can find themselves caught between providing high quality tuition, undertaking 
research and engaging with the wider community and third stream revenue generation that they are in 
danger of spreading themselves too thinly. The more focused strategy of PrivateCo gives them an edge 
in certain markets (Baines & Chiarelott, 2010). PrivateCo was able to market its courses to overseas 
students in a wide range of countries whereas the universities tended to focus their attention on what 
they saw as being a few key volume markets. Also PrivateCo developed its alumni network into an 
effective method of recruitment of overseas students by adding a high degree of personal 
recommendation to the normal marketing activities of universities. Baines & Chiarelott (2010, p.156) 
noted, “Theoretically, the university makes money on thousands of new students who never would have 
enrolled without the marketing intervention of the corporation”.  
Another key factor in recruiting student numbers owing to its high contact time and intensive tuition 
approach PrivateCo was able to recruit students onto its programmes at the lower end of the entry 
requirements required by the university. Students would typically undertake the equivalent of years one 
and two of an undergraduate programme, or terms one and two of a postgraduate programme, as a 
student of PrivateCo and then be formally transferred and enrolled to the University programme for the 
final year or final term, which was also delivered by PrivateCo. This effectively meant that PrivateCo 
acted as an access institution for the university partners. This articulation model of operation served 
two purposes: it increased the opportunities for students to undertake a UK higher education degree 
programme; and secondly, it limited the risk associated with student recruitment for the university, as 
students who were accepted on to the university programme in the final year were highly likely to finish 
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the programme successfully owing to the higher levels of support that PrivateCo was able to provide. 
The level of support offered to students in the early part of the degree programme translated into high 
pass rates, and ultimately a similar profile of degree classifications to that of the partner universities. 
Sufficient data on the universities learning and teaching strategy and levels of student support is not 
available to make a meaningful comment on the comparability of student success, but the high success 
rate of PrivateCo aided the recruitment of future students, reinforcing the finding of Aurini (2006) that 
pass rates can be used as a mark of legitimacy in some markets. The initial risk in the early part of the 
programme was taken by PrivateCo. Strict controls were in place to ensure that students met the visa 
requirements and PrivateCo liaised closely with the UK Border Agency, being mindful of the reputation 
of institutions that recruit heavily from overseas locations. It further enabled the universities to have 
oversight of the academic quality during the first two years, or terms, of study and more direct control 
over the final year. The more tangible benefit to the universities was the franchise fees received from 
PrivateCo. Thus in terms of a successful collaboration the universities brought credibility and name 
recognition, i.e. a degree of legitimacy; PrivateCo brought flexibility and an ability to provide student-
centred tuition in a limited range of subjects.  
The role of the Code of Practice in reinforcing 
the industry standards and norms  
The control of collaborative provision is governed to some extent by the QAA Code of Practice for the 
Assurance of Academic Quality and Standards in Higher Education (QAA, 2010). The criteria for tDAP is 
also largely based on the Code of Practice and the application process entails applying institutions 
evidencing how they conform to the criteria. What is interesting is that the QAA scrutiny of applying 
institutions is undertaken by peers drawn from within the established industry members.  It could be 
argued that in this way it ensures the perpetuation of the industry values and norms by judging new 
entrants based on established practices; almost an enforced means of isomorphism, i.e. rather than 
new entrants adopting established practices to ensure survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), new entrants 
do not get admitted to the tDAP club unless they comply. The Code of Practice relating to collaborative 
provision was updated and republished in October 2010 following a review prompted by the changing 
context in which collaborative provision occurred, in that the QAA recognised that “there has been an 
increase in the types of collaborative activity and diversification of the range of partners with which 
higher education institutions (HEIs) engage” (QAA, 2010, p.1). The updated Code takes note of the 
increasing trend towards globalisation of higher education and the growth in the private and for-profit 
higher education providers. 
The Code clearly identifies that it is the University that is responsible for managing the risk of the 
collaborative venture. However, the Code also recognises that collaborative arrangements will vary and, 
given the increasing complexity and range of provision, that one size does not fit all, thus leaving some 
autonomy to the universities as to the exact form of the mechanisms employed to manage 
collaborative arrangements.  The Code merely insists that institutions  “need clarity as to the locus of 
responsibility for the management and oversight of collaborative provision at institutional level and the 
ways in which accountability for this activity is assured in a consistent manner throughout the 
institution” (QAA, 2010, p.5). The Code makes it clear that it is the awarding institution’s responsible to 
ensure the academic standards of awards granted in its name and therefore the institution is 
responsible for managing the collaborative arrangements in a way that is capable of demonstrating that 
awards granted under a collaborative arrangement “meet the expectations of the UK Academic 
Infrastructure” (QAA, 2010, p.24).  
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The Code also states “The awarding institution’s policies and procedures should ensure that there are 
adequate safeguards against financial or other temptations that might compromise academic 
standards or the quality of learning opportunities” (QAA, 2010, p.28). One of the benefits of 
collaborative provision is the receipt of franchise fees for the university without the additional costs of 
provision. Clearly the onus is on the University to undertake sufficient due diligence prior to entering 
into a collaborative agreement, but in an age of austerity and a shifting of funding from state to 
institution, the temptation exists to gain the additional income: “While the mania for profitability seems 
to be antithetical to the altruistic, humanistic roots of higher education, the fiscal realities faced by 
administrators today have put institutions in survival mode” (Baines & Chiarelott, 2010, p,156). Indeed 
there have been several instances during the past few years where universities have been criticised by 
the QAA for a lack of control over its collaborative provision. The implication being that they were 
managed for financial benefits without adequate control (in the opinion of the QAA) over academic 
quality.  The Code is not explicit in the mechanisms that universities should employ in the management 
of their collaborative provision, but are clear that the mechanisms should be sufficient to ensure 
academic standards are maintained. It is perhaps significant that it is a Code and not a regulatory 
requirement enshrined in law. The validation process that PrivateCo went through with the partner 
universities essentially tested whether the organisation met the Code of practice for provision of higher 
education. This was also to form part of the evidence for the application for tDAP. Three new 
programme validation events took place during the period of the study which demonstrated a rigorous 
process was in place in each university. This process included a review of curriculum; learning, teaching 
and assessment strategies; resources including staffing and staff development; quality assurance 
procedures including administrative procedures; and student support services. The CEO was thus able 
to defend PrivateCo against criticism of quality standards by reference to the fact that it was subject to 
the same quality checks as its university partners. However, in the light of QAA reports that not all 
universities applied the same degree of rigour to its collaborative partners, the need to establish 
legitimacy for tDAP with the QAA provided an additional incentive to PrivateCo to be in a position to 
demonstrate adequate levels of quality assurance. The application for tDAP would open up PrivateCo to 
additional external scrutiny from industry members who did not have a vested interest in approving its 
procedures, thus adding additional pressure on PrivateCo to demonstrate compliance and hence its 
legitimacy.  
Part of the role of the researcher was to compile the evidence base for the application process. This 
involved collating historical documents and extensive liaison with the Collaborative and Quality 
Assurance offices of the partner universities. The aim of this exercise was to support the claim that 
PrivateCo was capable of maintaining quality standards in line with the industry standards. There was 
evidence that over a period of time PrivateCo had adopted the format and frequency of reporting, and 
style of recording meetings and decisions of its university partners. Based on a review of 
correspondence between the university partners and PrivateCo this was partly due to the insistence of 
the university quality assurance offices that the practices adopted by the university be replicated within 
PrivateCo. There were frustrations voiced among the staff of PrivateCo that this was not the most 
efficient way of working and there was open criticism of the ‘overly bureaucratic’ practices of the 
universities as an example. This could be indicative of the power relationship between the collaborative 
partners, or the willingness of PrivateCo to acquiesce in pursuit of legitimacy. The volume of students 
recruited to University A programmes, the first and longest association, put PrivateCo in a reasonably 
strong position as evidenced by negotiations on the financial arrangements between the two partners, 
and therefore the power relationship was not a significant issue as the arrangement was mutually 
beneficial.  This could be indicative of mimetic isomorphic processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and the 
adoption of the language, labels and goals of the industry as a means of appearing legitimate (Blum & 
11 
 
McHugh, 1971). There was also evidence of normative isomorphic tendencies as new staff were 
recruited from the established universities, again with tDAP and legitimacy in mind, who brought with 
them expectations of practices and norms to be found in the sector which filtered into the practices of 
PrivateCo. External examiners were sought and appointed from established universities. As the Head of 
Quality commented, ‘You are judged by who you associate with.’ There could be an argument that the 
outward show of conformance to industry practices was merely ‘window dressing’ in order to seek 
legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, in the early days PrivateCo relied heavily on the partner 
institutions for support, i.e. they adopted an integrative partnership relationship (Kivleniece & Quelin, 
2012) and with the frequency of contact with the university staff it would have been difficult to maintain 
a ‘sham’ in the long term (Stensaker & Norgard, 2001). Indeed PrivateCo was aware of the benefits of 
maintaining close relationships with its university partners as this helped sustain the reputation, 
enhance legitimacy and ultimately the recruitment of new students.  
Separation between academic and management 
structure 
PrivateCo utilised the same academic processes as the universities through the ‘normal’ committees 
that formed the academic infrastructure of a higher education institution. As far as the assurance of 
academic quality was concerned the structure was similar to that of a university, but the management 
structure resembled the governance of a commercial organisation. This inevitably created a tension 
between academic quality and financial objectives (Tapper & Slater, 1998; Marks, 2008). As part of 
preparing the organisation for the tDAP application there was a conscious decision to make a clear 
separation between the academic structure and commercial structure. New senior posts were created 
to facilitate this. A Head of Quality, Academic Registrar, Head of Undergraduate Programmes and Head 
of Postgraduate Programmes and a Dean of Learning and Teaching. These individuals did not sit on the 
Board of Directors. Decisions of academic quality were made by a newly created Academic Board that 
could effectively veto a decision made by the Board of Directors for reasons of quality. However, the 
Chief Executive always maintained that the aim was to provide high quality education to as many 
students as possible and to do that they needed to be financially secure, thus reconciling the financial 
aims with the academic quality. Indeed one of the criteria of the universities of a collaborative partner, 
and for tDAP, is financial viability as there is a risk of the partner, or institution, going out of business 
leaving the university with the responsibility to ensure that students are able to complete their 
programme. It could be argued therefore that commercial stability is compatible with quality standards 
so long as the quality is maintained at a level that satisfies the QAA standards. Based on the minutes of 
meetings the evidence suggests that the separation of academic and commercial activities and the 
creation of senior posts within PrivateCo would not have happened had it not been for the increased 
need to demonstrate conformance to expected norms as part of the tDAP application process. The 
main concern was to make PrivateCo conform to the expected structure of a university.  
Controls within the university partners 
The control of the collaborative provision was in the case of each university partner via a senior 
academic who undertook the role of liaison officer. The universities, due to their experience of 
collaborative provision each had a department that managed the collaborative provision and a 
collaborative officer that was in charge of this department. In all cases they worked closely with the 
quality assurance and academic registrar’s office within the university and liaised closely with the 
universities international office. The provision of programmes by PrivateCo for each university partner 
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was governed by the relevant university regulations. An interesting aspect of higher education is that 
although there is a Code of Practice and the QAA undertakes an oversight role in terms of academic 
quality via a periodic institutional review, the outcomes of which are published on the QAA website, 
there are differences in the way universities operationalise the Code of Practice and in the specific 
regulations governing its programmes. It was evident from historical records and conversations with 
both administrative and academic staff that this had caused difficulties and confusion in the past within 
PrivateCo. Therefore they took the decision to use the application for tDAP as an opportunity to review 
their own general and academic regulations (GARs). These were effectively revised so that they would 
be acceptable to all parties and that could be implemented with minimal impact on PrivateCo, i.e. they 
were revised on a consensus basis (Tolbert, 1985). A senior member of the registry team commented, 
“We developed the GARs pretty much based on what we could get away with from the partner 
universities. [smiles]. I mean what was acceptable to the partners. What we didn’t want to do was create 
something that was costly to administer. Not that they didn’t meet the Code of Practice, but we didn’t 
want to ‘go over the top’ in terms of being too onerous.’  
In relation to the collaborative arrangement the formal contact with each university is indicated in Table 
1. 
Table 1 – formal contact with university partners 
 University A University B University C 
Academic liaison officer Regular meetings Regular meetings Regular meetings 
Collaborative office Bi monthly meetings Once a term meeting (3 
times per year) 
Annual meeting 
Quality Assurance 
office 
Frequent contact via e-
mail  
e-mail contact in 
preparation for annual 
review meeting 
Irregular contact 
International office Twice a year planning 
meeting 
Irregular contact Irregular contact 
Senior management 
e.g. Pro Vice Chancellor 
or VC 
Strategy meeting twice 
a year 
Once a year Irregular contact 
 
The level of contact is concomitant with the proportion of business done with each university. Therefore 
there is a correlation to the strategic significance of the business for the university as well as for 
PrivateCo. There is no doubt that PrivateCo and the university benefit financially from the 
collaboration. The strategy meeting with University A and University B discussed plans for the 
expansion of the student numbers and set targets for recruitment. This filtered into the financial 
arrangements. Therefore there is a degree of financial incentive within the negotiated agreement. This 
is one of the reasons why it is important to monitor the quality standards of the provision. For a private 
sector organisation there is the potential conflict between the profit motive and the academic quality.  
For the university there is the temptation to take the fee income and turn a blind eye to quality issues 
(Tapper & Slater, 1998; Marks, 2008). However, the same reputational risk is associated with both 
parties that act as a check on undue profiteering. The university has a reputation to protect within the 
higher education sector and adverse publicity could impact on future student recruitment. Similarly the 
private sector institution relies on its reputation as a quality provided to recruit overseas students, as 
well as the good name of the university for reasons of legitimacy, and therefore could not afford to be 
seen to be providing substandard programmes, notwithstanding the fact that PrivateCo works with 
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three universities and a problem with one would impact on the business levels of the other partners.  
Therefore it is argued that the reputation risk factor associated with legitimacy within the sector acts as 
a control mechanism to ensure that quality standards are maintained at an acceptable level.  
The review of historical documents as part of building a body of evidence for the application for tDAP 
revealed that the level of involvement of senior management and other officers increased as the 
strategic importance of the collaboration increased. Initially all the collaborative agreements were 
negotiated by the collaborative office with oversight and approval by the senior management and 
appropriate university committees. In the early days of the collaborations they were managed by the 
liaison officer with support from the collaborations office or collaborations officer.  However, what 
became evident was that as the volume of students became larger and the strategic significance of the 
collaboration grew a pattern of more regular contact from a more senior level emerged. This was 
particularly true of University A where the collaboration was seen as a strategic alliance of significant 
benefit to the university, and also became more evident in University B as the number of locations from 
which programmes were offered increased creating the potential for a significantly increased level of 
students to be recruited onto the programmes. The other aspect that emerged from this review of the 
historical data is that the level of power that PrivateCo was able to exert in the negotiations concerning 
fee levels and targets increased as the significance of the alliance increased. This indicates a shift in the 
power base and in some respects increased the tensions between the academic quality and financial 
objectives of the collaboration for both parties. As the financial significance for the university increases, 
so it could be argued the temptation to relax quality standards increases. This was suggested to be the 
case in several institutional reviews conducted by the QAA between 2007 and 2010 where evidence of a 
relaxing of the management of collaborative providers was highlighted in their findings. However, the 
need for legitimacy and the reputational risk within the sector had a positive influence on the 
maintenance of quality standards, in that the CEO saw the two factors as being inherently linked. A 
strong collaboration and assurance of quality standards provides legitimacy which enhances reputation 
and students recruitment.  
Conclusion 
Evidence suggests that particularly in the early days of the collaborations the university partners had a 
strong influence over the adoption of specific quality assurance practices within PrivateCo. Whilst both 
parties to the collaborations benefited (May & Winter, 2007) the balance of power was with the 
universities as it was their reputation that was at stake (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). This enabled them 
to exert their influence over the policies and practices adopted by PrivateCo. This was also driven by the 
existence of the Code of Practice that seeks to promote quality assurance within the higher education 
sector and places the responsibility on the university partner to manage the risks of collaboration (QAA, 
2010). As the collaboration developed and the degree of trust between the parties increased the 
relationship became more equal (Bardach, 1998). Also preparing for tDAP, and the need to demonstrate 
legitimacy within the sector as part of the application, had a positive impact on the adoption of quality 
assurance practices. The fact that the collaborations could be utilised to demonstrate PrivateCo’s ability 
to maintain quality standards influenced the adoption of industry values and norms as PrivateCo was 
driven to strengthen its academic infrastructure even further and in the words of the Head of Quality, 
“to look more like a university than a commercial organisation” in the pursuit of legitimacy. Whilst there 
were isomorphic forces at work (DiMaggio & Powell, 1977) it could also be argued that the existence of 
the Code of Practice itself and the criteria for degree awarding powers ensures that new entrants 
comply with the norms of the sector before they are permitted to enter. This confirms the findings of 
Meyer et al. (1983) that organisations seeking to enter complex and regulated environments, such as 
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the education sector, are driven to adopt the practices and procedures of the established players. The 
experience of PrivateCo indicates that opening up the organisation to the QAA institutional review by 
applying for tDAP, necessitated the adoption of the established values and norms of the sector. 
Collaborations with established players were used as evidence that it had done so. 
The potential implications of the experience of PrivateCo is that if all private sector providers of higher 
education were subject to the same quality assurance regime as institutions holding tDAP, as opposed 
to only those imposed by the collaborative partners, there would be the potential for a stronger 
incentive for private providers to increase quality assurance standards by virtue of seeking to enhance 
their legitimacy within the sector.   
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